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MOTHER JONES MEETS GORDON GEKKO: 
THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LABOR AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
MATTHEW T. BODIE∗
In 2007, private equity firms came under increasing scrutiny 
for the favorable tax treatment accorded to their fund man-
agers' compensation.  Labor, particularly the Service Work-
ers International Union (“SEIU”), was instrumental in 
bringing this issue to the attention of the media and the pub-
lic. However, SEIU's private equity campaign is just one way 
in which the union is pursuing its primary concern: increas-
ing the ranks of its members.  This Article examines the role 
that the SEIU private equity campaign plays both in the 
overall debate about private equity taxation as well as in the 
union's negotiations with private equity firms.  It argues 
that SEIU is using the campaign not only to promote 
changes in public policy, but also to pressure private equity 
firms to work with the union on issues such as card-check 
agreements.  Unions, like other businesses, should be free to 
pursue their political agendas—agendas that serve their in-
terests as businesses.  Efforts to restrict union political activ-
ity are based on an outdated vision of union representation 
and would cause (if enacted) further distortions to the mar-
ket for political influence. 
INTRODUCTION 
Last year marked the twentieth anniversary of the movie 
Wall Street.1  The movie provided a brilliant encapsulation of 
the financial markets in the 1980s.2  Private equity funds, hos-
∗ Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  A.B., Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., New York University School of Law.  
Thanks to the participants at the Second Annual Colloquium on Current Scholar-
ship in Labor and Employment Law for their comments and questions.  Thanks as 
well to the University of Colorado Law School, the University of Denver Sturm 
College of Law, and the Colorado Law Review for hosting the conference.  Sarah 
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 1. WALL STREET (Amercent Films 1987). 
 2. For a discussion of the film’s depiction of business, see Larry Ribstein, 
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tile takeovers, insider trading—all are colorfully and sharply 
depicted.  The most iconic figure is of course Gordon Gekko, the 
takeover artist who seduces the protagonist, Bud Black, into 
betraying his ideals and his father in the pursuit of great 
wealth.3  Although twenty years have passed, Gekko himself 
might be forgiven for being even more at home in this era.  Pri-
vate equity firms have made big splashes throughout all sec-
tors of the economy.  These funds have bought out some of this 
country’s largest companies, including Clear Channel Commu-
nications,4 Bausch & Lomb,5 and Chrysler Automotive (now 
Chrysler LLC).6  Several private equity funds raised substan-
tial investment funds through the public markets through lu-
crative initial public offerings.  Fund executives have en-
sconced themselves at the top of the wealth pyramid.7  Stephen 
Schwarzman, CEO of the Blackstone Group, took his company 
public at the same time he threw himself a $4 million birthday 
party.8  Schwarzman, whose wealth and style have invited 
comparisons to Gekko,9 recently fueled the comparison by in-
Imagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 165 (2006). 
 3. Gekko’s speech to the Teldar Paper shareholders remains an oft-cited 
paean to the virtues of self-interest.  See, e.g., id. at 186–87. 
 4. Associated Press, Clear Channel Shareholders Approve Buyout, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/business/media/26 
clear.html?ref=business.  At the time of this writing, however, the banks that 
were funding the deal were threatening not to go through with it.  See Michael J. 
de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Six Banks are Sued in Clear Channel Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/busi 
ness/media/27radio-web.html?scp=5&sq=%22Clear%20Channel%20Deal%22&st= 
cse. 
 5. Bausch & Lomb Holders Approve Warburg Pincus Buyout, INT’L            
BUS. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20070921 
/bausch-amp-lomb-warburg-pincus-buyout-approve.htm. 
 6. Nick Bunkley, With Sale, Chrysler’s Identity is Simplified, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2007, at C9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/business/04 
auto.html. 
 7. It is now a matter of pop culture wisdom that the richest of the rich       
are hedge fund and private equity managers.  See, e.g., Duff McDonald, The    
Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 9, 2007, available at 
http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30341/ (noting that “[t]hree out 
of ten of us think the average hedge-fund pro makes more than $10 million a 
year”). 
 8. Liz Smith, Bash Makes History, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.ny 
post.com/seven/02162007/gossip/liz/bash_makes_history_liz_liz_smith.htm        
(estimating that the party – feting 600 guests with entertainers Patti LaBelle, 
Martin Short, and Rod Stewart – cost between $3 and $4 million). 
 9. See, e.g., Kurt Andersen, Greed is Good and Ugly, N.Y. MAG., July 23, 
2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/imperialcity/34990 (“Steve Schwarzman 
is a perfect poster boy for this age of greed, sharklike, perpetually grinning, a tiny 
Gordon Gekko without the hair product.”). 
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vesting $600 million in a Chinese company called BlueStar—a 
company with the same name as the airline in Wall Street that 
provides the critical denouement.10
All this conspicuous wealth generation and dissipation 
raises concern and even outrage over private equity’s increas-
ing wealth and power.  The media has indulged in breathless 
coverage of the parties, the art purchases, the bonuses, the an-
nual compensation, and the occasional meltdown—often with a 
blend of disgust and envy.11  Not unexpectedly, private equity’s 
resurgent wealth and power attracted the attention of Con-
gress.  The summer of 2007 saw multiple Congressional hear-
ings12 and proposed legislation.  There were bills specifically 
targeted at the Blackstone IPO,13 as well as Representative 
Rangel’s “mother of all tax reforms” that would raise taxes on 
private equity, hedge funds, and venture capital firms.14  Me-
dia reports indicate a pitched battle between the private equity 
industry and a variety of other interest groups.15
 10. Jessica Winter, Greed is Bad. Bad!, SLATE, Sept. 25, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2174672/. 
 11. See McDonald, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 8; John                          
Carney, Amaranth Meltdown Roundup, DEALBREAKER,  Sept. 20, 2006, 
http://www.dealbreaker.com/2006/09/amaranth_meltdown_roundup.php; see also 
Daisy Ku & Kate Holton, Blackstone Defends Private Equity Role in                
Business, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/innovation 
News/idUSL266319520071126?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=10000 
(discussing Schwarzman’s view that private equity is “a destructive force with a 
short-term perspective, levering companies and stripping their assets to enrich a 
few nasty people like me”). 
 12. See, e.g., Carried Interest, Part I: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
110th Cong. (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/site 
pages/hearing071107.htm; Carried Interest, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 110th Cong. (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/ 
sitepages/hearing073107.htm; Carried Interest Part III: Pension Issues: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing090607.htm. 
 13. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid= 
f:s1624is.txt.pdf; H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid= 
f:h2834ih.txt.pdf.  For an overview of the Blackstone IPO and its tax engineering, 
see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012472. 
 14. Lisa Lerer, Professor’s Proposal Angers Wall Street, POLITICO.COM, Oct. 
30, 2007, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=ED41ADCB-3048-5C12-00 
6DB3713DD44940. 
 15. Big Day in Washington for Carried Interest Debate, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Sept. 6, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/ 
09/06/big-day-in-washington-for-carried-interest-debate. 
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It should not be surprising to find labor unions involved in 
this fight.  The taxation of private equity cuts to the heart of 
labor’s political agenda: namely, ensuring fair treatment for 
working men and women.  Taxing the wealthiest at a rate less 
than half that of the average worker is a perfect example of the 
political “stacked deck” that unions rail against.  Without a 
doubt, unions have worked hard, both publicly and behind the 
scenes, to reform the existing tax rates for private equity.  One 
union, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), has 
been out front on this issue.  It established an initiative called 
“Behind the Buyouts” designed to inform the public about the 
role of private equity—an initiative that has included a lengthy 
policy paper, street theater, and political action.16
It may seem obvious that SEIU, along with other unions, 
would fight tooth-and-nail against private equity and would 
push hard for legislation raising taxes on the fund managers.  
And indeed, much of their activity has fallen into this predict-
able vein.  The reality, however, is more complicated.  Yes, 
SEIU is involved in the current Congressional activity on the 
carried-interest issue.  And yes, SEIU has promoted concerns 
about private equity through its websites, its reports, and even 
through political theater.17  At the same time, however, in 2007 
SEIU did not officially take a position on any of the pending 
private-equity-oriented legislation.18  As its materials make 
 16. Nathan Vardi, Hill to Hear Union Concerns, FORBES.COM, May 14, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2007/05/14/chrysler-buyout-congress-lead-
manage-cx_nv_0514unions.html (noting that SEIU “recently started a private eq-
uity campaign featuring a Web site, behindthebuyouts.org”). 
 17. See, e.g., Buyout Tax Debate Hits the Hamptons, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Aug. 30, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/ 
08/30/buyout-tax-debate-hits-the-hamptons. 
 18. Since the initial draft of this article in fall 2007, SEIU has grown more 
aggressive in its approach to private equity.  There are signs that the union has 
moved away from its silence on the tax bills and is now supporting those bills.  
For example, the union recently placed an ad in Roll Call which states plainly, 
“Close the carried tax loophole.  Support HR 6725.”  (HR 6275 refers to the Alter-
native Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008.  See H.R. 6275, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2008), available at http://www.thomas.gov/ (“Search Bill Text” for Number “H.R. 
6275”; select a version of the bill to view).  Section 710 of the Act provides that in-
come from investment services partnership interests shall be treated as ordinary 
income for tax purposes.  Id.  However, this movement does not change the pa-
per’s thesis: namely, that the private equity initiative is a combination of ideologi-
cal commitment and savvy negotiating tactics.  As time has passed, the union has 
stepped up its pressure on private equity firms.  See Thomas Heath, Ambushing 
Private Equity, WASH. POST, April 17, 2008, at D1 (“[SEIU’s Stephen] Lerner and 
[Andy] Stern began meeting with the heads of the big private-equity firms about a 
year ago, asking them to be more generous with health care, salaries and other 
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clear, SEIU is not opposed to private equity as long as private 
equity is sufficiently worker-friendly.  In other words, the un-
ion’s ultimate stance on private equity taxation may depend on 
the industry’s willingness to work with labor. 
Labor’s complicated relationship with private equity 
should prompt reconsideration of two standard narratives that 
inform our traditional approach to labor law.  First, SEIU’s 
campaign illustrates that a binary, labor-against-capital sys-
tem of labor law ignores a much more complicated twenty-first 
century reality.  Although unions and employers may have 
competing interests, they also have complimentary interests 
that savvy unions are exploring.  Instead of seeing unions sim-
ply as public service organizations that protect worker rights, 
unions should be recognized as members of a service industry 
that pursue better terms for their members and growth for 
their organizations.  Rather than being surprised when unions 
act like sophisticated businesses, we should welcome this new 
development. 
Second, there is the longstanding narrative about the dis-
tinction between union spending on politics and spending on 
collective bargaining.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that unions must differentiate their spending between collec-
tive bargaining representation expenses and non-
representation expenses such as spending on political causes.19  
All represented employees must pay representation expenses, 
but they may opt out of paying for non-representation activi-
ties.20  The SEIU’s political campaign on the private-equity 
taxation issue provides yet another example of the illogic of 
this distinction.  Like any other industry, unions must use 
their resources to protect their interests in the halls of govern-
ment.  The notion of a separation between politics and collec-
employee benefits. . . . When the union didn’t get the response it wanted, it turned 
up the heat.”). 
 19. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of 
Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 
(1961). 
 20. Employees who are represented by a union have the choice whether or not 
to become members of that union.  However, unions may still charge non-
members for the cost of representation expenses.  See NLRB v. General Motors 
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744–45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop” agreements 
whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of collective representation).   
However, states are permitted under § 14(b) of the NLRA to outlaw agency shop 
agreements.  29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2000).  Twenty-two states currently have “right 
to work” provisions outlawing such agreements.  MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., 
LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 982–83 (5th ed. 2003). 
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tive bargaining rests on a flawed vision of the union’s role in 
both arenas. 
This Article describes a new vision for the relationship be-
tween labor unions and capitalists.  Part I provides background 
on the resurgence of private equity and discusses the tradi-
tional labor response to this growth.  Part II discusses SEIU’s 
innovative approaches to workplace representation, from the 
“Change to Win” coalition to the focus on card-check represen-
tation agreements.  In Part III, this Article focuses on the com-
plicated interactions between labor (particularly SEIU) and 
private equity funds.  Finally, Part IV addresses how SEIU’s 
private equity campaign should influence our conceptions of 
unions as political actors. 
I.  THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND LABOR’S 
TRADITIONAL RESPONSE 
Private equity firms serve a unique role within the world 
of high finance.  They specialize in targeted takeovers of whole 
companies with a limited period of ownership.  Private equity 
firms generally manage separate funds—pools of money in 
which sophisticated investors place significant chunks of 
money for an extended period of time (usually ten years).21  
The firm manages the fund with an eye towards making large 
returns before the end of the fund’s life span.  The modus oper-
andi of most private equity firms is to use their funds to take 
control of companies and then resell the company by the end of 
the fund’s term.  These big-ticket investments are the primary 
difference between private equity and other funds, such as 
hedge funds or mutual funds.  While most other funds have a 
wide range of different investments on any particular day, pri-
vate equity managers place a few large investments over the 
course of the ten-year fund.22
Private equity firms thus have a unique blend of long-term 
and short-term incentives when managing their funds.  On the 
one hand, private equity firms must take great care in making 
their investments; they do not leap in and out of positions on 
 21. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity             
(ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 082/2007, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114. 
 22. Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., Comment, A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming 
the System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 242 (2005) 
(noting that most investments have a time horizon of seven to thirteen years). 
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the value of the Thai baht, for example.23  Because of this care, 
private equity firms have been characterized as shareholders 
with uniquely low agency costs: they have the combination of 
financial stake, attentiveness, and control that can allow them 
to oversee management effectively.24  However, private equity 
firms also have some significant pressures to make a fast 
profit.  First, the fund’s life span is ticking from its beginning; 
the funds must all be returned (with profits) at the end of the 
span.  Second, and more significantly, most private equity 
deals rely on debt in order to finance the control transaction.  
Private equity firms generally borrow in the range of fifty to 
seventy–five percent to finance the transaction,25  and the debt 
service begins immediately.  Thus, private equity firms must 
often find quick savings in order to make interest payments. 
Because private equity firms are (1) solely focused on their 
returns as shareholders, and (2) interested in finding fast ways 
of saving money, their interests often conflict with the interests 
of workers at the newly-acquired company.  In seeking to cut 
costs, the first place to look is often the workforce.  In the 
1980s, private equity funds frequently made their money by 
simply taking over a company, putting in new management, 
terminating a percentage of the workforce, selling off or closing 
underperforming divisions, and then reselling the remaining 
company for a profit.26 Sometimes management became in-
volved in such takeovers through a leveraged buyout.  But in 
other cases, the private equity firm pursued a hostile takeover 
such as the Teldar Paper tender offer in Wall Street.27
In contrast, the 1980s were a difficult time for unions and 
their members.  Many of the manufacturing jobs that were the 
unions’ bread and butter were leaving the country for cheaper 
overseas labor.  Companies that had implicitly given their 
workers a lifetime employment contract began reneging on 
 23. See Phillip L. Zweig, The Hedge Funds: The Rich Get a Little Richer, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 25, 1997, http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b35411 
91.htm (discussing various hedge fund positions in the Thai currency). 
 24. For a discussion of the agency cost advantages to private equity, see Mi-
chael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61 
(1989). 
 25. See Robert Bartlett, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Dis-
torts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 2004 
(2008) (discussing studies that show an average of sixty percent debt-to-equity ra-
tios for 2006 buyouts, and an almost ninety percent ratio for completed buyouts 
between 1980 and 1989). 
 26. See generally Jensen, supra note 24. 
 27. See Ribstein, supra note 2. 
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those contracts and firing workers with significant seniority.  
President Reagan’s firing of illegally-striking air-traffic control-
lers legitimized efforts to replace striking employees as well as 
tougher labor negotiations.28  At the same time, hostile take-
overs fueled by private equity and their ilk became the apo-
theosis of the cold-blooded capitalism that had seemingly taken 
over the country. 
The response of unions to private equity was predictable 
and economically justified.  Unions lobbied to give management 
greater protection against hostile takeovers—reasoning, per-
haps, that the devil you know is better than the one you 
don’t.29  The most significant tangible results of this lobbying 
were the many “corporate constituency” statutes that sprang 
up in late 1980s and early 1990s.30  These constituency stat-
utes provided that a company’s board of directors could take all 
of the stakeholders of a corporation into account when consid-
ering a transformative transaction.31  Thus, rather than simply 
looking at the deal from the perspective of the shareholders, 
the board could look to the interests of employees, bondholders, 
customers, and even the local community in making its strate-
gic decisions.  The purpose of these statutes was to provide a 
statutory excuse for boards’ efforts to block takeover attempts 
that may have been beneficial to shareholders but harmful to 
management and employees.  Private equity deals were the 
quintessential target for this legislation.  However, constitu-
ency statutes had no real independent power in preventing 
 28. Michael H. LeRoy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injection: Na-
tional Emergency Strikes under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to 
Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 66 (2001) (“President Reagan’s firing of nearly 12,000 
air traffic controllers in response to a 1981 strike is also identified as a pivotal 
event in the decline of strikes. Some observers argue that this strike-response en-
couraged private employers to break, rather than settle, strikes.”) 
 29. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to 
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47 (1998) (“During [the 
1980s], unions generally supported corporate management in resisting hostile ac-
quisitions by, among other things, pushing for stronger state antitakeover laws 
and accepting defensive employee stock ownership plans. Employee shareholders 
also supported a host of other antitakeover devices that insulated management 
from the consequences of poor performance.”). 
 30. Thirty-one states currently have such statutes on their books.  See 
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Compe-
tition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006). 
 31. For an example of a corporate constituency statute, see N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2006). 
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hostile takeovers and other worker-unfriendly transactions; at 
best, they simply gave directors more discretion.32
As the recession hit in the late 1980s and the stock market 
cooled off, private equity receded somewhat from public view.  
At the same time, unions and their affiliated pension funds 
took a more active role as players in the markets and in corpo-
rate governance.33  In some situations, labor was just bringing 
traditional battles to a new forum.34  However, in other cases, 
unions began to form new alliances with other institutional in-
vestors in a renewed effort to police management.  These ef-
forts often cut against the labor-management alliances that 
had been formed in the 1980s.  For example, union pension 
funds proposed shareholder resolutions asking that companies 
eliminate certain antitakeover defenses, such as the poison 
pill.35  These resolutions sought to dismantle the protections 
that unions helped to erect in an earlier decade.  They demon-
strated the possibility of a new union and pension-fund mind-
set that was more comfortable with other shareholders than it 
was with management. 
 32. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforc-
ing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580 n.4 (1992) (citing a 
letter from Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, to 
Mario Cuomo, Governor for New York (June 6, 1989)).  See id. at 581 (“The prin-
cipal criticism of rejecting this traditional relationship is that authorizing the 
board to consider constituencies that have no monitoring or enforcement powers 
would leave the board accountable to nobody.”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 
2065 (2001) (“[A] stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave 
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own 
agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor 
national wealth, but only their own.”). 
 33. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Govern-
ance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019 (1998) 
(“In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institu-
tional shareholders.”). 
 34. See id. at 1025–27 (discussing “new union tactics in pursuit of old union 
goals,” such as one union’s corporate campaign against Albertson’s grocery stores). 
 35. Id. at 1027–29 (discussing one such proposal).  “Poison pill” is the termi-
nology used for certain defensive strategies that target companies employ to de-
feat a hostile takeover.  The most common example of a poison pill involves the 
distribution of a new class of stock to the common shareholders.  This stock con-
tains certain provisions that will dilute the equity holdings of a hostile bidder 
should the bidder endeavor to go forward without the target board’s approval.  
The target board distributes this stock to shareholders in order to prevent a hos-
tile bid from going forward.  However, the board also retains the option to cancel 
these provisions, in order to allow the board to approve a bid at its discretion.  
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights 
Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 839 (1998). 
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This mindset carried over into the new century—in fact, it 
is probably now even stronger.  Scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom provided further fuel to an already growing fire of 
resentment and concern from the putative “owners” of the cor-
poration, the stockholders.36  A new wave of shareholder activ-
ism has pushed for greater control and power for shareholders 
in their relationship with the incumbent management.  Share-
holder activists have been sharply critical of excessive execu-
tive compensation;37 have fought against conflicts of interest 
between the board and the executives they oversee;38 and have 
sought greater power over the corporation’s leaders and gov-
ernance structure.39  These concerns were met with concrete 
changes in policy, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley independent di-
rector requirements,40 the SEC’s new required disclosure for 
executive pay,41 and the Second Circuit’s recent ruling that 
shareholders could use existing resolution procedures to nomi-
nate directors.42
 36. It is a misnomer to call shareholders the owners.  See Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 
604 (2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-
Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) 
(“From both a legal and an economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own 
the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).  However, shareholders 
are entitled to the residual profits of the corporation, and thus they have particu-
lar incentives to make sure management maximizes this residual. 
 37. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) 
(arguing that the high levels of executive compensation are explained better by 
power relationships, rather than executive performance). 
 38. In one well-known example, Disney shareholders pursued a derivative 
suit blaming the board for failing to oversee the compensation package of one-time 
president Michael Ovitz.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 39. See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc. 
462 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting shareholders to propose easier 
shareholder access for board nominations); Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for In-
creasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 862–65 (2005) (arguing that 
shareholders should be able to initiate changes to the corporation’s charter or 
place of incorporation).  For an overview of Bebchuk’s role in pushing for share-
holders’ rights, see Dan Slater, The Activist Professor, THE DEAL, June 4-10, 2007, 
at 40. 
 40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. IV 
2004) (requiring independence for all audit committee members). 
 41. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act 
Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf. 
 42. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 462 F.3d at 123.  The case 
involved a shareholder proposal under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 that 
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Labor has been deeply involved in this new movement.  
Unions and their affiliated pension funds are some of the larg-
est institutional shareholders.43  The unions have continued 
their efforts to work with other shareholders to oversee man-
agement and increase shareholder returns.  In the shareholder-
nomination proposal case, it was a union, after all, that sub-
mitted the shareholder proposal and brought the subsequent 
litigation.44  Critics of the new “shareholder democracy” move-
ment often single out unions as the type of shareholders that 
will unduly benefit from pro-democracy reforms.45
As unions become more likely to ally with shareholders, 
one might expect a warmer relationship between labor and pri-
vate equity.  Indeed, there are undoubtedly greater financial 
ties.  Although the precise holdings of private equity firms are 
kept secret, pension funds are among their investors.46  How-
ever, there has been less evidence of the type of mutual alli-
would have amended the company’s bylaws to allow shareholders to nominate di-
rectors for election on the company’s proxy ballot.  The court held that under then-
existing regulations, the SEC could not permit companies to exclude such propos-
als on the grounds that they are related to an election.  However, the SEC has 
since clarified its rules to permit the exclusion of such proposals.  See SEC Re-
lease No. 34-56914, Dec. 6, 2007, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-56914.pdf. 
 43. State and local pension funds alone control approximately ten percent of 
the U.S. equity market.  David Hess, Public Pension Funds and the Promise of 
Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable 
Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 225 (2007). 
 44. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 462 F.3d at 123–24. 
 45. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Commentary, Unions Abusing Pension 
Funds for Politics, EXAMINER.COM, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.examiner.com/a-
919085~Stephen_Bainbridge__Unions_abusing_pension_funds_for_politics.html 
(arguing that the SEC should “consider carefully” the investors it empowers, since 
union pension funds have interests that are counter to other shareholders); John 
Carney, Against Shareholder Democracy, DEALBREAKER, Sept. 27, 2007, 
http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/09/against_shareholder_democracy.php (noting 
the “even grimmer scenario” of unions using shareholder initiatives to procure 
better pay for their members); Larry E. Ribstein, The “Shareholder Democracy” 
Scam, IDEOBLOG, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder 
.html (Oct. 27, 2006, 07:35) (“Corporate elections are unions’ last opportunity to 
shore up their declining clout.”). 
 46. Pension Funds Moving Asset Allocation to Alternative Investments, Study 
Finds, DAILY LABOR REPORT, March 15, 2005 (citing report that pensions had in-
vested three to four percent of their funds in private equity, but that they also 
planned to invest more in the upcoming year); Robert Reich, Commentary, Corpo-
rate, Public Pensions Roll the Dice (MARKETPLACE podcast July 18, 2007),  
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/07/18/corporate_public_pensi
ons_roll_the_dice (noting that state pension plans have as much as twenty per-
cent of their investments in private equity and hedge funds, and that some corpo-
rate plans have as much as forty percent in such funds). 
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ances that labor has formed with other investor groups.  Pri-
vate equity seems less concerned with the greater transpar-
ency, lower executive compensation, and democracy-facilitating 
reforms of the shareholder democracy movement.  Indeed, pri-
vate equity continues to work in the rip-tide of the movement.  
Some have argued that reportedly pro-shareholder reforms 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley have increased the costs of being a 
public company and thus have heightened the incentives to go 
private.47  Private equity firms are happy to participate in the 
process; in addition, they have reportedly been willing to re-
ward their management handsomely, in ways that are less ac-
ceptable in the public realm.48
And there are still the traditional conflicts that arise when 
private equity looks to take over a unionized company.  The re-
cent buyout of Chrysler Automotive by Cerberus Capital Man-
agement is instructive.  Chrysler merged with the German 
company Daimler Benz in 1998 and subsequently become a di-
vision of the larger company.  Although the merger received 
significant criticism for its treatment of Chrysler sharehold-
ers,49 Chrysler’s unionized workers had less to fear from the 
German takeover, given Germany’s employee-oriented “code-
termination” policies.50  For example, the president of the In-
ternational Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW) sat on the 
DaimlerChrysler supervisory board pursuant to these poli-
cies.51
 47. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric L. Talley, Going-Private 
Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769; 
Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ 
Going-Private Decisions (May 6, 2004) (working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=546626. 
 48. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 21. 
 49. Chrysler’s largest shareholder prior to the merger sued DaimlerChrysler 
afterwards claiming that the assertions concerning a “merger of equals” were 
fraudulent misrepresentations.  Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 
212, 216 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, the suit was not successful.  See id. at 232–33 
(finding no misrepresentations). 
 50. See BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW 
DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 249 (2000) (noting that “[e]ven labor’s 
champions could hardly find fault with [the merger]”). 
 51. Mark Landler & Micheline Maynard, Chrysler Group to be Sold for $7.4 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/ 
15/automobiles/15chrysler-web.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Landler%20&%20Maynard 
&st=cse&oref=slogin. 
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In 2007, DaimlerChrysler indicated an interest in selling 
off the Chrysler division.  The announcement came after a se-
ries of poor financial results, including the downgrading of its 
bonds and a 2006 operating loss of $1.5 billion.52  The company 
laid off over 13,000 workers and closed one plant.53  Despite 
the company’s poor showing, union leaders were adamant 
against the sale of the company to a private equity firm.  In 
April, UAW president Ron Gettelfinger characterized private 
equity bidders as “strip and flip artists” who were out to make 
a quick buck off the company.54  He likened them to vultures 
“hovering overhead right now.”55  The media tended to echo 
Gettelfinger’s fears.56
A month later, however, Chrysler was sold to the private 
equity firm Cerberus Capital Management.  Cerberus is an un-
usually secretive firm, even for private equity.57  It has a repu-
tation for bringing its own group of executive talent into play 
as part of its takeover strategy.58  Cerberus had been involved 
in large deals before, but nothing as large or as prominent as 
Chrysler.  Perhaps in light of Cerberus’s reputation, current 
chairman John Snow was careful to indicate a willingness to 
work with labor as part of the deal.59  More surprising was the 
UAW’s eventual blessing.  After the announcement of the 
 52. Eric Weiner, Q&A: Under the Hood of the Chrysler Deal, NPR, May 14, 
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10184023. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Dale Russakoff & David Cho, New Labor Strikes Deals With “Private Eq-
uity Guys,” WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at A1. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Frank Langfitt, United Auto Workers Support Chrysler Sale 
(NPR    broadcast May 15, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=10184023 (“While private equity is generally looking to cut 
costs by cutting jobs and benefits, unions are busy trying to protect them.”). 
 57. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Savior For Chrysler? Read On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2008, at C1 (quoting Cerberus founder Stephen Feinberg as saying “[w]e de-
spise all the public attention we are getting”), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/business/19sorkin.html?scp=1&sq=%22A%20
Savior%20for%20Chrysler%22&st=cse; Emily Thornton, What’s Bigger Than 
Cisco, Coke, or McDonald’s?, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_40/b3953110.htm (discussing 
how Cerberus’s founder has a more “well-developed” penchant for secrecy than 
most private equity fund managers). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Nick Bunkley, Workers Surprised as Union Backs Sale to Private           
Equity Firm, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/14/business/14unions.php (quoting John 
Snow: “Cerberus has a good record of working successfully with companies that 
are organized. . . .We respect the role of organized labor. We appreciate the sup-
port the UAW has given.”). 
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merger, Gettelfinger said it was “in the best interest of [the] 
membership.”60  He further conceded that “once that decision’s 
been made, then you’ve got to deal with the cards that you’re 
dealt,”61 and the “vulture” rhetoric disappeared.  Many workers 
remained suspicious of the merger, particularly because of the 
union’s earlier fears.62  As one worker expressed: “Are they 
buying us to help us out or to suck the blood?  It’s kind of 
scary.”63  The announcement that no layoffs were currently 
planned did little to quell fears.  As one automotive analyst 
noted, the UAW thought private equity “would be the end of 
the world, and in some ways it probably would be.”64
Although it is too early to tell how the deal will ultimately 
shake out for its participants, it has thus far shown signs of the 
traditional private-equity-meets-unionized-industry narrative.  
Cerberus hired Robert Nardelli to be Chrysler’s CEO; Nardelli 
had been forced out at Home Depot after having notoriously 
bad relationships with institutional investors.65  The big con-
cern prior to the merger was the negotiation of a new labor deal 
after the prior deal’s expiration in September.66  After striking 
GM for two days to get a new collective bargaining agreement, 
the UAW needed to strike Chrysler for only six hours to get a 
similar deal.67  However, despite the deal’s blessing by UAW 
leadership, Chrysler workers only narrowly approved the new 
agreement.68  Soon after the approval, the new owners insti-
 60. Id. 
 61. Chrysler Workers Worried, OAK. TRIB., May 15, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20070515/ai_n19111684. 
 62. Bunkley, supra note 59 (“Chrysler workers were warned a few weeks ago 
by union officials that a private equity owner would be the worst thing that could 
happen to them. So many were as surprised as anyone on Monday to learn that 
the sale of Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management had their leaders’ sup-
port.”). 
 63. Chrysler Workers Worried, supra note 61. 
 64. Landler & Maynard, supra note 51. 
 65. Alex Taylor III, Nardelli is Strike One for Chrysler, FORTUNE,               
Aug. 6, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/06/news/companies/ 
chrysler_nardelli.fortune/index.htm?section=money_topstories (noting that 
Nardelli “arrives on the heels of an enormous fiasco at Home Depot”). 
 66. Indeed, prior to the sale it was thought that these labor talks would doom 
any potential for a deal.  Union Negotiations May Hold Up Chrysler Sale,        
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), April 24, 2007, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/union-negotiations-may-hold-up-
chrysler-sale. 
 67. Micheline Maynard, A 6-Hour Strike by Auto Workers Against Chrysler, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/ 
business/11auto.html. 
 68. Micheline Maynard, Workers at Chrysler Narrowly Approve 4-Year      
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tuted massive layoffs—layoffs that were double what many had 
expected.69  Commentary on the layoffs included the notion 
that “[p]rivate equity is much better equipped to take the Dra-
conian cuts” than public companies and that the layoffs consti-
tuted “stripping,” a reference to Gettelfinger’s “strip and flip” 
comment.70  Chrysler also announced a two-week shutdown in 
July—a vacation shutdown in which employees would have to 
use their vacation time.71  In February, Cerberus came under 
fire for a letter it sent to its investors.  The letter noted that the 
firm did “not need to be heroes” to do well on its Chrysler in-
vestment, perhaps indicating that the firm would staunch its 
losses rather than trying to save the firm.72  Most recently, the 
company has had to fend off rumors of impending bank-
ruptcy.73
The uncertain and suspicious relationship between Cer-
berus and the UAW is characteristic of the usual relations be-
tween labor and private equity.  Private equity takes over a 
compromised but still surviving industry; labor protests but is 
ultimately powerless to do anything; massive layoffs ensue.  
However, there are indications that in other arenas, these often 
antagonistic players may find themselves in increasingly com-
plicated relationships. 
II.  SEIU’S NEW APPROACH 
SEIU is the largest and fastest-growing union in the coun-
try.74  The union currently has almost two million members, 
Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/10/28/business/28auto.html (noting concerns that “the contract did not pro-
vide as many guarantees of future work as a similar contract approved by workers 
at General Motors earlier this month, after a two-day strike”). 
 69. Micheline Maynard, Job Cuts at Chrysler Go Even Deeper                    
Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/business/02auto.html?scp=1&sq=%22Job%20
cuts%20at%20Chrysler%22&st=cse. 
 70. Id. at C8. 
 71. Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate Blog, Chrysler’s Closure, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/03/chryslers-closu.html (March 13, 2008).  
In his email to employees, Nardelli said that “[a]s a private company, we all need 
to think like owners and do our part to accelerate Chrysler’s recovery and trans-
formation.”  Id. 
 72. Sorkin, supra note 57. 
 73. David N. Goodman, Chrysler Denies Bankruptcy Talk, Welcomes      
Iacocca, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 26, 2008, available at 
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/080626/chrysler.html. 
 74. Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, (Magazine), at 38. 
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having grown from 600,000 members twenty years ago.75  Its 
remarkable growth is even more impressive given the workers 
that the union seeks to serve.  SEIU focuses on health-care and 
other service workers, particularly property services such as 
janitorial and maintenance workers.76  Many of these workers 
receive low wages and have few skills that the market values 
highly.  SEIU has taken these workers and formed a powerful 
presence in economic and corporate life. 
Much of the credit for SEIU’s recent success has been at-
tributed to its colorful and charismatic leader, Andy Stern.  
Stern started his career as an organizer for an SEIU local in 
the 1970s and a decade later rose to be the national organizing 
and field services director.77  Working with then-SEIU presi-
dent John Sweeney, Stern helped develop a plan for growth 
that almost doubled the union’s size in eight years.78  Sweeney 
rode the union’s success to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 
1994.79  After Sweeney chose another union officer as his in-
terim replacement at SEIU, two years later Stern ran against 
the replacement and won the presidency.80
Stern’s words and actions since taking office have made 
him perhaps the most prominent union leader since Jimmy 
Hoffa.  Most controversially, Stern is regarded as the catalyst 
behind the coalition of unions who broke from the AFL-CIO.  In 
2005, seven of the largest and most prominent unions left the 
AFL-CIO to form the Change to Win Coalition.81  The move fol-
lowed an effort by the Coalition unions to change certain AFL-
CIO practices.  The Coalition had proposed greater union con-
solidation (in order to promote industry concentration), greater 
coordination between unions in bargaining and organizing, and 
a fifty percent rebate of AFL-CIO dues to those unions who im-
plemented a strategic plan for organizing and growth.82  How-
 75. See ANDY STERN, A COUNTRY THAT WORKS: GETTING AMERICA BACK ON 
TRACK 55–56 (2006); Service Employees International Union (SEIU), What Is 
SEIU?, http://www.seiu.org/faqs/faq_whatisseiu.cfm (last visited May 24, 2008). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Bai, supra note 74, at 41; STERN, supra note 75, at 44–51. 
 78. STERN, supra note 75, at 56. 
 79. Id. at 61. 
 80. Id. at 61–63. 
 81. The seven unions are SEIU, the Teamsters, the United Farm Workers, 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, the Laborers, the 
Carpenters, and UNITE HERE (the needletrades, hotel, and restaurant workers).  
Change to Win: The American Dream for American Workers, About Us, 
http://www.changetowin.org/about-us.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
 82. STERN, supra note 75, at 88; David Moberg, Chips Fall in Vegas, NATION, 
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ever, the AFL-CIO executive committee rejected the fifty per-
cent rebate in favor of a smaller one, and the Coalition mem-
bers left the AFL-CIO three months later.83
The Coalition members’ decision to leave the established 
conglomeration of mainline unions caused surprise and con-
sternation among outside observers and union supporters.84  
The move was initially characterized as a dispute over the level 
of political spending, with the AFL-CIO allegedly wanting more 
and the Coalition members wanting less.85  Stern has charac-
terized this as a misrepresentation.86  In fact, the move is bet-
ter characterized as a step towards Stern’s broader vision for a 
renewed labor movement.  It is a vision that, in many ways, 
sees the union movement not as a political endeavor but rather 
as a humanitarian business enterprise. 
Stern certainly recognizes the difficulties that unions face 
from increasing globalization and employer hostility.87  How-
ever, Stern is more willing than most union leaders to place 
some of the blame at the feet of unions themselves.88  As his 
position was once characterized: “if any other $6.5 billion cor-
poration had insisted on clinging to the same decades-old busi-
ness plan despite losing customers every year, its executives 
would have been fired long ago.”89  Stern believes that union 
leaders have been too content with the status quo and have not 
done enough to staunch the continued declining rates of un-
ionization. 
How does SEIU attack declining rates of unionization?  
Part of the answer is simply increased funding: SEIU has fun-
neled resources into organizing ever since Stern became na-
tional organizing director in the 1980s.90  Stern believes all un-
ions should adopt a similar focus.91  A critical component of the 
Coalition’s agenda for change was the “50 percent rebate” for 
March 3, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050321/moberg. 
 83. STERN, supra note 75, at 92–98. 
 84. See, e.g., Howard Fineman, A Democratic House Divided, NEWSWEEK, 
June 27, 2005, at 34. 
 85. Id. at 34 (noting that Coalition members would be “more focused on orga-
nizing drives than on electoral politics”). 
 86. STERN, supra note 75, at 93. 
 87. Id. at 32–36 (discussing globalization); id. at 49–50 (discussing employer 
hostility); id. at 71 (discussing Wal-Mart Watch). 
 88. Bai, supra note 74, at 40 (noting that Stern was “pointing the finger back 
at his fellow union leaders”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. STERN, supra note 75, at 55–56, 63–64. 
 91. Bai, supra note 74, at 43. 
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organizing proposal, which would funnel money back to 
growth-oriented unions.92  However, the answer has not simply 
been money.  SEIU has used its resources in a multi-pronged 
approach designed to maximize leverage over the widest possi-
ble spectrum.  Although any categorization risks oversimplifi-
cation, it is possible to specify five components of SEIU’s ap-
proach: (1) industry concentration, (2) organizing an entire 
area, (3) neutrality and card-check agreements, (4) multi-
faceted political and economic pressure, and (5) “added value” 
to the employer. 
First, SEIU has focused on organizing only those types of 
employees within its ambit of expertise.  When he became 
president of SEIU, Stern worked to move members who worked 
in areas outside of the health or building-service industries into 
relationships with other unions.93  Although this reallocation 
hurt SEIU’s rolls in the short-term, Stern believes it was im-
portant to reorient the union towards its core members.  He 
contends that as a result, other unaffiliated unions in the jani-
torial and health-care industries decided to affiliate with 
SEIU.94  This concentration on certain sets of employees is 
critical to Stern’s overall plan for union success.  Concentration 
not only provides the union with a better knowledge base, but 
it also allows the union to flex its muscles more powerfully, 
since it does not have to compete against other organizations.  
Indeed, Stern believes his calls for significant consolidations 
within the AFL-CIO were critical to that organization’s suc-
cess.95  One union has more market leverage within an indus-
try than three unions representing the same set of employees. 
The importance of concentration is related to a second fac-
tor in SEIU’s organizing success: focus on whole regions rather 
than individual employers.  The traditional union drive seeks 
to organize employees at a particular employer and then move 
on to other employers.  However, such an approach is problem-
atic in the service industries, where companies compete to keep 
their labor costs low.96  If SEIU successfully organized one em-
ployer, that employer’s costs could potentially cripple the com-
pany’s business.  Thus, SEIU has focused on organizing all of 
 92. STERN, supra note 75, at 88. 
 93. Id. at 65–66. 
 94. Id. at 66. 
 95. Bai, supra note 74, at 43. 
 96. In the health care and building services industries, labor costs represent a 
significant portion of overall expenses. 
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the employees in a particular region.  In campaigns to organize 
janitors in Los Angeles, Houston, and New Jersey, SEIU has 
implemented a strategy of seeking to get all of the major com-
panies on board, rather than pursuing them seriatim. 
In New Jersey, for example, SEIU struck a deal with com-
panies who provided janitorial services: for those companies 
whose employees joined SEIU, the union would not seek to in-
stall a contract with new wage increases unless more than half 
of the companies in the area signed up as well.97  In Los Ange-
les, SEIU mounted campaigns city-wide to organize workers as 
part of the “Justice for Janitors” campaign.98  The concentra-
tion of workers into a relatively small number of firms made 
such a campaign easier.99  And in Houston, SEIU pressed the 
city’s five major building maintenance companies to sign an 
agreement making it easier for the union to recruit workers at 
all five companies at the same time.100  The union successfully 
organized four of the companies and reached a common collec-
tive bargaining agreement with them a year later.101
Third, SEIU has worked hard to implement neutrality and 
card-check agreements with companies at the start of the orga-
nizing process.  Although such agreements can vary in their 
provisions,102 they essentially ask the employer to agree to two 
things: (1) remain neutral as to the union’s organizing cam-
paign (“neutrality”), and (2) recognize the union if a majority of 
employees sign cards asking to be represented by the union 
(“card-check”).103  These agreements are a mainstay of the 
SEIU campaign strategy, as they allow for a simpler and more 
expeditious organizing process.104  In fact, in some instances 
 97. Bai, supra note 74, at 42. 
 98. Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Be-
yond, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 22, 
28–29 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379 
(2007). 
 101. See Steven Greenhouse, Cleaning Companies in Accord with Striking 
Houston Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A18. 
 102. See Sachs, supra note 100, at 378. 
 103. For a general discussion of these agreements, see James Brudney, Neu-
trality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Para-
digms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 829–30 (2005). 
 104. The card-check certification process would have become law under the 
proposed Employee Free Choice Act.  This past summer, the bill was passed by 
the House but failed to reach cloture in the Senate.  See Roll Call Vote on H.R. 
800, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote 
_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00227. No Democratic Senator voted 
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SEIU must stage a ferocious campaign not for the first con-
tract, but rather to get the employer to agree to a neutrality 
and card-check agreement.105
As part of their regional strategy, SEIU organizing drives 
usually share a fourth factor: bringing political and economic 
pressure on the employers from as many points as possible.  
The notion of applying outside pressure is not a new one, but 
SEIU’s multi-faceted and creative approaches have taken these 
tactics in a new direction.  One facet is the use of public pres-
sure.  By seeking to organize an entire region at a time, SEIU 
can seek to bring the issue to the public’s attention.  Rallies, 
marches, and even hunger strikes have been employed to bring 
attention to the low wages of janitorial employees.106  The visi-
ble nature of these actions gives negative publicity to compa-
nies who usually seek to avoid the spotlight. 
However, the pressure does not stop there.  Since building 
maintenance contractors are generally supplying their services 
to residential or commercial building owners or management 
companies, SEIU has sought to apply pressure to these firms 
as well.  In the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign in 
2000, SEIU’s strike was accompanied by creative political and 
community action, and it pressured the building owners into 
working out a solution.107  And in Miami, the union sought the 
support of local and national politicians, professors, and stu-
dents in its dealings with the University of Miami.  Even 
though the janitors were employed by an outside contractor, 
the university controlled the dynamics of the negotiations be-
tween the union and the contractor.  When the employees ulti-
mately organized the contractor, the university chose not to re-
place the contractor, and it adopted wage and benefit 
requirements that helped cement the employees’ newfound 
level of remuneration.108
Finally, a fifth factor in the SEIU organizing campaigns 
has been seeking to bring some additional value to the table for 
against cloture. 
 105. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Of Service Workers, Contracting Out, Joint Em-
ployment, Legal Consciousness, and the University of Miami (Univ. Miami         
Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 2007–06, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1020623 (discussing SEIU strike at the University of Miami). 
 106. See, e.g., Erickson et al., supra note 98; Casebeer, supra note 105. 
 107. Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 49 (noting that one of the area real es-
tate magnates “threatened to make his own arrangement with the union if the 
contractors did not agree to settle the dispute”). 
 108. Casebeer, supra note 105. 
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the employers.  Along with the pressures from the multi-
faceted organizing drives, SEIU seeks to make itself a partner 
with the companies they are organizing, rather than solely an 
adversary.  Stern has been upfront about his willingness to 
work with employers to bring “added value” to the equation.109  
Some have criticized SEIU for being too willing to work with 
employers at the expense of employee interests.110  But SEIU 
sees its methods as creative ways to help both manager and 
worker achieve economic success. 
One way to bring additional value to the table is through 
politics.  SEIU has used its political clout to bring additional 
revenues into the health care industry, helping both employers 
and employees.  A common SEIU tactic has been to work with 
employer groups to procure more government health care fund-
ing.  For example, Stern described the SEIU New York Local 
1199 and its relationship with local hospital groups in the fol-
lowing way: 
The hospital industry’s own efforts to increase its reim-
bursement rates were viewed as self-serving, just another 
interest group trying to feed at the trough of taxpayer dol-
lars.  But when SEIU 1199’s nurse aides, social workers, 
and nurses lobbied for increased state funding for the hospi-
tal, their more sympathetic faces reframed the discussion.  
While the hospitals were minimally politically active, SEIU 
1199 was a political powerhouse, a fixture in Albany.  SEIU 
1199’s record-setting political contributions and members, 
who could flood the legislative corridor when needed, gave 
them the clout to be the legislators’ best friend or worst 
nightmare.  [Union leader] Dennis [Rivera] and the industry 
leaders used their coordinated efforts in Albany to win bil-
lions of dollars of reimbursements for the hospitals, which 
translated into stable balance sheets for the employers and 
excellent wages and the gold standard of benefits for hospi-
tal workers, including multi-million dollar training and up-
grading funds for workers.111
 109. STERN, supra note 75, at 70–71; Bai, supra note 77, at 42. 
 110. See Matt Smith, Union Disunity, SF WEEKLY.COM, April 11, 2007, 
http://www.sfweekly.com/2007-04-11/news/union-disunity [hereinafter Smith, Un-
ion Disunity] (complaining of a “sweetheart deal” between SEIU and California 
nursing home companies). 
 111. STERN, supra note 75, at 72. 
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One controversial example of such a quid pro quo was the 
recently-terminated California nursing homes agreement.112  
Under the agreement, SEIU was to help the nursing home 
companies achieve more funding and better regulation, and in 
return SEIU could organize under a card-check and neutrality 
agreement.  Thanks to SEIU’s political support, California in-
creased funding for nursing home providers and secured almost 
$1 billion in federal matching funds for its reimbursement sys-
tem.113
However, critics lambasted several aspects of this deal.  
First, SEIU allegedly agreed to lobby for limitations on the liti-
gation rights of patients against the homes.114  Second, em-
ployees who signed up with the union under these agreements 
were allegedly restricted in their ability to report problems 
with the quality of safety of the care.115  Third, employees who 
signed up were given a provisional contract under a template 
agreement that purportedly did not give them much say in 
their contract.116  Although SEIU was able to sign up several 
thousand nursing home employees through the agreement, it 
recently terminated the deal.117
It would be wrong to characterize any of the five SEIU fac-
tors—concentration, geographic organizing, card-check cam-
paigns, multi-faceted pressure, and “added value” to the em-
ployer—as completely novel.  The novelty is the combination of 
these factors, together with the level of success SEIU has en-
joyed in the current era.  This multi-pronged approach is also 
at play in SEIU’s effort to work with the scions of capitalism in 
the private equity campaign. 
 112. Mark Brenner, SEIU Ends Nursing Home Partnership: California Deal 
Left Members out of Organizing and Bargaining, COUNTERPUNCH, June 25, 2007, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/brenner06252007.html. 
 113. Michelle Amber, SEIU Terminates Controversial Agreement With Nursing 
Home Chains in California, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 114, at C–1 (June 14, 
2007). 
 114. Matt Smith, Partners in Slime, SF WEEKLY.COM, June 30, 2004, 
http://www.sfweekly.com/2004-06-30/news/partners-in-slime/full.  These efforts 
were said to have been put on hold after the story.  Smith, Union Disunity, supra 
note 110. 
 115. Smith, Union Disunity, supra note 110. 
 116. Id. (arguing that the agreements “prohibit the workers from having a say 
in their job conditions”). 
 117. Amber, supra note 113.  See also Kris Maher, Unions Forge Secret Pacts 
with Major Employers, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2008, at A1 (discussing secret 
agreements between large companies and SEIU which provide certain benefits for 
and restrictions on union organizing at those companies). 
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III.  SEIU’S PRIVATE EQUITY CAMPAIGN 
SEIU’s private equity campaign took place on a turf that is 
familiar to the union but unfamiliar to many private equity 
players.  Although private equity firms have been plying their 
trade for many years, the industry had little presence in Wash-
ington, D.C. circles.  In fact, private equity did not even have a 
lobbying group until February 2007.118  Although the firms had 
substantial financial power, their lack of political presence 
made them vulnerable when the taxation of private equity be-
came a major issue in the last year. 
To understand the issue, a brief discussion of private eq-
uity compensation is in order.  Private equity managers are 
generally paid fees based on a small percentage of the overall 
investment they manage as well as a larger percentage of the 
profits they generate.119  These fees are usually a two percent 
“value of the fund” fee in addition to twenty percent of the prof-
its that the fund makes.120  The twenty percent of profits is 
taxed at the fifteen percent capital gains rate, as compared 
with the thirty–five percent tax rate on income.121  This per-
centage of profits, known as “carried interest,” is taxed not at 
the income rate, but rather at the significantly lower capital 
gains rate.122
Although this tax structure has long been in existence, it 
did not attract attention until last spring.  Several private eq-
uity firms called attention to the unique tax advantages of such 
firms when they made initial public offerings earlier in the 
year.  Beginning with Fortress Investment Group in February 
and continuing through the Blackstone Group, these firms 
managed to tap into the public equity markets and retain their 
tax-advantaged partnership status.123  Their complicated 
structure—a blend of limited partnerships and LLCs—belied 
any purpose other than managing this beneficial tax status.  
One senator complained that the deals treated taxes not as the 
 118. Private Equity Council, About the Private Equity Council, 
http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/about/. 
 119. This pay structure is referred to as “two and twenty”: the managers get 
two percent of the overall investment as well as twenty percent of the future prof-
its of the fund.  See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits 
in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 14. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
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fair share owed to society, but rather as “an obstacle course to 
be gamed and gotten around.”124  The prominent tax games-
manship of these IPOs, particularly the Blackstone IPO, called 
attention to the underlying benefits that all private equity 
firms enjoy.125  Thanks in part to a scholarly paper,126 Con-
gress has taken up the taxing disparity in earnest.  Over the 
summer of 2007 Congressional committees held several hear-
ings on the issue, and several bills were introduced to change 
the tax treatment of private equity firms.127
Given the nature of the debate, one might expect unions to 
be in the thick of it over private equity’s favorable tax treat-
ment.  And indeed, labor has been supportive of efforts to raise 
taxes on these firms.  The AFL-CIO supports legislation that 
would raise the taxation rates on private equity carried inter-
est and would close the loophole allowing Blackstone and other 
publicly-traded partnerships to avoid corporate taxation.128  
SEIU is notable, however, because it pursued a much more in-
tensive approach. 
The centerpiece of SEIU’s private-equity engagement is a 
forty-two page policy paper entitled “Behind the Buyouts.”129  
 124. Alan Zibel, Blackstone’s Tax Strategy Comes Under Scrutiny in Washing-
ton, AP WIRE, July 13, 2007 (quoting Senator Baucus). 
 125. John E. Morris, First-Mover Disadvantage, THE DEAL, June 25–July 8, 
2007, at 24 (noting that the publicity from the Blackstone IPO “may have blown 
up on it”). 
 126. See Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 119.  For a discussion of the 
influence of Fleischer’s paper on the private equity taxation debate, see John Car-
ney, Private Equity Taxes: The Capitol Hill Tax Clash Heats Up, DEALBREAKER, 
Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/09/private_equity_taxes_the_ 
capit.php (calling Fleischer “the intellectual godfather of the private equity tax 
hikes”); Lerer, supra note 14 (quoting a tax policy expert as saying that Fleischer’s 
paper “really did ignite this debate over private equity taxation”); Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, A Professor’s Word on the Buyout Battle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew 
Ross Sorkin ed.), Oct. 3, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/a-
professors-word-on-the-buyout-battle (discussing the “whirlwind” the paper has 
caused). 
 127. The bills range in their coverage.  Some bills would only cover publicly-
traded partnerships such as Blackstone.  See S. 1624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1624is.txt.pdf (also known as the “Blackstone Bill”).  
Other bills would cover private investment management partnerships, such as 
private equity firms, and real estate partnerships.  See H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. 
(1st Sess.  2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db 
name=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h2834ih.txt.pdf. 
 128. See AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement, Private Equity and Hedge 
Funds, August 8, 2007, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec 
08082007b.cfm (supporting H.R. 2834 and S. 1624). 
 129. Service Employees International Union, Behind the Buyouts, April 2007, 
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The purpose of the report, according to its introduction, is to 
provide “a snapshot for everyday investors, workers, commu-
nity members, and the public about the private equity buyout 
industry and its practices.”130  The report focuses on the top 
five private equity firms and describes their principals (the 
“moneymakers”), their investors (“money sources”), and their 
deals (“printing money”).131  It also provides brief narratives of 
five private equity deals: four that can be characterized as 
“bad” deals and one that is a “good” deal.132  The four bad deals 
involve poor decision-making, crushing debt burdens, laid-off 
workers, and failed companies, yet the buyout firms still pay 
themselves oversized (and premature) returns.133  The fifth ex-
ample shares many similarities: a buyout firm purchases a set 
of ailing manufacturing plants, lays off workers, and engages 
in hard bargaining with the primarily union workforce.  How-
ever, this story has a substantially happier ending, as the com-
pany provided workers with shares in the company in exchange 
for concessions.  As a result, when the company’s fortunes 
boomed and the private equity firm cashed in, the workers 
were able to share in profits.134
As part of its program of reforms, “Behind the Buyouts” 
suggests that private equity firms “should play by the same set 
of rules as everyone else.”135  The report has a sophisticated 
explication of the tax treatment that private equity receives.136  
It discusses the tax advantages of debt over equity, the taxing 
of carried interest as capital gains rather than income, and the 
uniquely favorable tax treatment of private equity firms that 
have gone public.137  In its final recommendations, the report 
says that private equity should “invest in the health, security, 
and long-term prosperity of America by supporting equitable 
tax rates and the elimination of loopholes that increase the tax 
burden on working Americans.”138
http://www.behindthebuyouts.org/storage/documents/5433-
300H_whitepaper_revise8-20.pdf [hereinafter Behind the Buyouts]. 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. Id. at 22–27. 
 132. Id. at 28–32. 
 133. Id. at 28–31. 
 134. Id. at 31–32. 
 135. Id. at 35. 
 136. Id. at 15–16. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 35. 
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The “Behind the Buyouts” report provides a centerpiece to 
SEIU’s ongoing campaign on private equity, which includes po-
litical activity, street demonstrations, and a blog.139  Other tac-
tics have been used as well.  For instance, in a creative bit of 
street theater, SEIU performers staged a mock protest in the 
Hamptons.140  The performers, caricatures of wealthy snobs, 
complained about the possibility of higher taxation on private 
equity with slogans such as “protect the emerging plutoc-
racy.”141  As the director of SEIU’s private equity project 
stated, “[t]he idea that people who have so much money need to 
have a more privileged tax status than other people is so ab-
surd.”142
On the surface, much of the SEIU private equity campaign 
follows the traditional path of labor against capital.  The “Be-
hind the Buyouts” report is designed to convey a sense of fear 
and concern about the powerful and secretive buyout firms who 
can wreak havoc on productive industries.  And yet the picture 
is not so clear-cut.  Despite this rhetoric, throughout 2007 
SEIU did not take an official position on the taxation bills in 
the Senate.143  This did not appear to be due to a concern that 
the legislation fails to go far enough.  Instead, staying on the 
sidelines appeared to be a conscious strategy, designed to ex-
tract as much leverage as possible from the politics of the 
situation. 
The ongoing “Behind the Buyouts” campaign is part of a 
complicated effort to engage with private equity on many lev-
els.  Certain elements of the campaign are consistent with tra-
ditional unionism: creative attacks on wealth and privilege, ef-
forts to make the tax system more progressive, and publicity 
campaigns designed to put pressure on private equity as em-
ployers of union members.  However, there also appears to be 
another subtext: namely, an effort to engage with private eq-
uity on a nationwide level in order to expand the union’s mem-
 139. SEIU also has had specific blogs for certain firms, such as a blog about 
Blackstone prior to the IPO.  Julie Creswell, A Union Takes Cautious Aim at 
Blackstone’s Public Offering Plan, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2007, at C6.  At first, 
the blog did not identify itself as SEIU-related.  Id. 
 140. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Buyout Tax Debate Hits the Hamptons, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Aug. 30, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2007/08/30/buyout-tax-debate-hits-the-hamptons. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. There was no indication, in the report or on the website, that SEIU has 
officially endorsed the two proposed bills that would raise private equity tax rates. 
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bership across a new set of companies.  In this sense, the pri-
vate equity campaign is at various times either a carrot or a 
stick designed to make SEIU an attractive working partner 
with private equity firms. 
SEIU’s relationship with private equity extends beyond the 
traditional Washington interest-group lobbying.  As the “Be-
hind the Buyouts” report acknowledges, SEIU and its members 
have a direct financial relationship with private equity.144  
SEIU members invest in pension funds, and these funds gener-
ally invest between five and ten percent of their holdings with 
private equity firms.145  Thus, union pension funds are par-
tially responsible for the high fees collected by private equity 
managers, since they are willing to pay them.  SEIU is no ex-
ception. 
Moreover, the tone of the “Buyouts” report is more equivo-
cal than one might expect, particularly on a close reading.  As 
the report makes clear, it is not against private equity when 
private equity works to include employees in its wealth genera-
tion.  As the report states in its conclusion: 
[T]he incredible wealth that exists in the private equity 
buyout industry presents a historic opportunity to help cre-
ate real opportunities for the millions of working people who 
are being shut out of the American Dream.  There is more 
than enough wealth in the buyout business for the buyout 
firms to continue to prosper while also adapting their exist-
ing business model to expand opportunities to benefit work-
ers, communities, and the nation.146
The report seems to be saying that private equity is not inevi-
tably anti-worker; rather, private equity has simply failed to 
follow a more equitable model up to this point. 
What, exactly, would be a more equitable model?  The re-
port contends that private equity firms should give workers 
and communities a voice in the buyout process and a stake in 
the returns they generate.147  In particular, workers should 
have a seat at the table during deals, as well as good paychecks 
and benefits.  In addition, workers should have the ability to 
choose a union through “majority sign-up without interference 
 144. Behind the Buyouts, supra note 129, at 11. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 34. 
 147. Id. at 35. 
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from any party”—in other words, a neutrality and card-check 
certification agreement.148
SEIU has specific reasons for wanting such accommoda-
tions from private equity.  The Carlyle Group—one of the five 
biggest private equity firms in the United States—recently 
purchased Manor Care nursing homes.149  The Toledo-based 
Manor Care Inc. has about 500 nursing and assisted living care 
centers staffed by 60,000 employees.150  SEIU is trying to or-
ganize these employees, and its multi-pronged approach is in 
evidence.  The union is seeking a neutrality and card-check 
agreement from Manor Care, and it is applying tremendous po-
litical and public pressure on Carlyle in support of its negotia-
tions.  Since the purchase, SEIU has staged public demonstra-
tions raising concerns that Carlyle will seek to cut costs and 
reduce care in order to make a quick profit.151  These concerns 
were reinforced by a New York Times article discussing the 
problems of for-profit nursing home care.152  Two Congres-
sional committees will begin investigations into business prac-
tices at nursing homes owned by private investment groups.153  
Moreover, Senators Baucus and Grassley, who lead the Senate 
Finance Committee, sent letters to Carlyle and four other pri-
vate-equity firms asking for information related to their owner-
ship and management of nursing homes.154  Baucus and 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Manor Care Shareholders Approve Buyout, BOSTON.COM, Oct. 18, 
2007, http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2007/10/18/manor_care 
_shareholders_approve_buyout/. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Thomas Heath, Union Protests Carlyle’s Bid for Manor Care, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 20, 2007, at D4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/19/AR2007091902055.html. SEIU has created a     
website on this issue.  See Carlyle Fix Manor Care Now, http://carlylefixmanor 
carenow.org (last visited May 22, 2008); see also Dan Primack, Human         
Rights & Private Equity, PRIVATE EQUITY WEEK WIRE, Dec. 11, 2007, 
http://www.pewnews.com/story.asp?sectioncode=44&storycode=43512 (discussing 
SEIU’s criticism of Carlyle Group for selling a percentage on the firm to an Abu 
Dhabi sovereign wealth fund); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Union Protest Roils Private 
Equity Conference, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.), Jan. 18, 
2008,  http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/union-protest-roils-private-
equity-conference (discussing SEIU’s protest of a speech by Carlyle managing di-
rector David Rubenstein at an academic private equity conference). 
 152. Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 1.1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/ 
business/23nursing.html. 
 153. Charles Duhigg, Nursing Homes Owned by Private Equity Face             
U.S. Inquiries, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/24/business/nursing.php. 
 154. Thomas Heath, Under Pressure, Carlyle Issues Patient Promise, WASH. 
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Grassley are the same Senators who have proposed the “pub-
licly-traded partnership” taxation bill.155  All of this scrutiny 
prompted Carlyle to take the unusual step of issuing a state-
ment promising to provide adequate staffing and resources to 
Manor Care patients.156
SEIU was also behind another piece of legislation that 
would have put pressure on Carlyle.  The California state legis-
lature considered a bill that would bar its state pension funds 
from investing in any private equity fund which is partially 
owned by countries with human rights concerns.157  Carlyle is 
one such firm, having sold a 7.5% stake to the sovereign wealth 
fund of Abu Dhabi.158  Although the bill ostensibly was con-
cerned about the influence of foreign governments, many com-
mentators saw it as an effort by SEIU to put pressure on Car-
lyle.159  Critics pointed out that the bill targeted investments 
from Abu Dhabi but not China.  The Wall Street Journal 
claimed that: “China got a pass because its sovereign wealth 
fund invests with the Blackstone Group private equity firm, 
and the SEIU has negotiated janitorial agreements with Black-
stone real-estate companies.”160  State-employee funds such as 
POST., Oct. 22, 2007, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/21/AR2007102101034.html. 
 155. See S. 1624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.acc 
ess.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1624is.txt.pdf; 
H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. 
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h2834ih.txt.pdf. 
 156. Heath, supra note 154. 
 157. The countries invested in the private equity funds through their sovereign 
wealth funds.  The Responsible Private Equity Investment Act of 2008, California 
A.B. 1967, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_1951-
2000/ab_1967_bill_20080214_introduced.html (describing countries’ investments 
as part of the legislative counsel’s digest of a proposed California bill). The coun-
tries targeted were those that had not signed on to certain human rights treaties. 
 158. The Associated Press, Abu Dhabi Lays Out Investment Principles for its 
Government-Run Wealth Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., March 18, 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/18/business/NA-FIN-US-Abu-Dhabi-
Sovereign-Wealth.php. 
 159. Editorial, CalPERS Board Must Keep Its Priorities Straight,  
SACRAMENTO BEE, March 17, 2008, at B4, available at 
http://www.sacbee.com/110/story/790480.html (noting that “[t]he Service 
Employees International Union is the driving force behind Torrico’s bill” and that 
“SEIU’s real target appears to be the Carlyle Group”).  But see Stephen Lerner, 
Letter to the Editor, SEIU Seeks Ethics, Good Returns, WALL ST. J., April 26, 
2008, at A8 (“The Service Employees International Union supported California’s 
Responsible Private Equity Investment Act because it was in the best interest of 
global human rights and long-term responsible investing.”). 
 160. Editorial, California’s Stern Rebuke, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2008, at A16 
[hereinafter WSJ California Editorial].  But see Behind the Buyouts, SEIU Re-
1348 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) and the California State Teachers’ Retirement Sys-
tem (CalSTRS) were believed to oppose the bill, fearing that it 
will hurt their ability to invest effectively.161  Although the bill 
was initially given a fair chance of passage,162 it was ultimately 
tabled.163
This campaign directed at Carlyle has the hallmark ele-
ments of a comprehensive SEIU organizing drive.  It focuses on 
a concentrated set of employees.  It seeks to get a neutrality 
and card-check certification agreement that will expedite the 
organizing drive for these employees.  It is using pressure from 
a variety of sources: public and client concern, media coverage, 
Congressional investigations, related legislation, and worker 
protests.  But where is the added value?  SEIU’s public cam-
paign against Carlyle has shown the “stick” side of its negotiat-
ing strategy.  The carrots may not exist, or they may only be 
discussed behind closed doors.  But it is possible to see the po-
tential for “added value” in several places.  SEIU has demon-
strated its willingness and ability to secure government re-
sources in support of its affiliated industries.  In fact, SEIU 
made its pact with California nursing homes that led to in-
creased governmental funding to these industries, benefiting 
both management and workers.  And there may even be a 
higher level of negotiations going on here.  SEIU not only has 
its political power to throw behind increased health care fund-
ing; it can also support higher “carried interest” taxation as 
well.  SEIU’s decision to hold off on endorsing a bill may have 
been an implicit offer to private equity: work with us, and we 
will back off from supporting higher taxes.  Even though SEIU 
has come out with more explicit support for reform, that sup-
port can always been tamped down, or quietly withdrawn. 
SEIU has been masterful at marshalling a variety of pres-
sures on its negotiating opposites.  The private equity cam-
sponds to the Wall Street Journal, http://www.behindthebuyouts.org/seiu-
responds-to-wsj (last visited May 21, 2008) (stating that “AB 1967 looked to 
whether countries had signed certain ‘core’ human rights treaties (as identified by 
the United Nations),” and that “China has signed onto the treaties in question”). 
 161. The CalSTRS board voted to oppose the legislation.  The CalPERS board 
did not hold a vote, but its chief investment officer told state lawmakers that the 
bill would have a negative impact on the fund.  WSJ California Editorial, supra 
note 160. 
 162. Matthew Wurtzel, Could CalPERS, CalSTRS Exit Private                      
Equity?, DEALSCAPE, April 1, 2008, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/2008/04/ 
could_calpers_calstrs_exit_pri.php. 
 163. WSJ California Editorial, supra note 160. 
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paign might be just another pressure that can be applied or 
laid off as part of the grand scheme of union growth.  Rather 
than being a separate political project, it may be part of an 
overall plan to work with private equity as partners instead of 
supplicants.  Such negotiations are secret, if they have hap-
pened or are happening at all.  But they would explain much 
about the exact nature of SEIU’s private equity campaign. 
IV.  LABOR AND THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS 
“Interest-group politics” is a term with unfavorable conno-
tations.  The many economic interest groups that lobby Con-
gress for favorable treatment, along with the money they 
shovel into the process, are often derided as the root of our po-
litical failures.  Measures such as the McCain-Feingold cam-
paign finance legislation have endeavored to remove some of 
the effects of money on the process.164  Although the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Act,165 critics 
contend it has only forced special interest lobbying into new 
channels.166  Many believe that any true reform is impossible. 
Labor unions are restricted in their ability to participate in 
the political process.  In 1947, the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act prohibited unions from contributing to federal elec-
tion campaigns.167  The provision was construed narrowly by 
the Supreme Court, allowing unions to donate to campaigns as 
long as the monies were paid out of voluntary, separately-
administered political funds.168  The prohibition has been 
fleshed out in subsequent legislation.169  Most recently, the 
 164. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81) (codified as part of FECA, in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 36 U.S.C.). 
 165. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm., 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003). 
 166. Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications 
for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 
1182–84 (2007) (discussing the criticisms of so-called “527 Groups” for their “crea-
tive ways to evade campaign finance laws, through legal ‘loopholes’ or arguably 
illegal ones”). 
 167. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 
(1947). 
 168. See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United 
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
 169. Section 304 was repealed by § 201(a) of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 496 (1976), and replaced by 
Section 112(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 
94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 486-490 (1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
(1982)). Section 441b prohibits the use of agency fees by unions in connection with 
federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).  This provision was further modified 
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McCain-Feingold Act extended the restrictions on political ad-
vocacy to include all “electioneering communications.”170  The 
Supreme Court upheld this extension.171
Under these campaign finance provisions, unions must 
generally play by the same rules as corporations.  However, 
they face a separate hurdle to their political spending.  In a se-
ries of cases interpreting both the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 
and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Supreme 
Court has determined that unions do not have the right to re-
quire objecting nonmembers to pay for costs outside those in-
curred in collective bargaining.172  Outside of states with “right 
to work” provisions, unions may require both members and 
nonmembers to pay for the union’s costs of representing the 
bargaining unit.173  However, there are limitations on the types 
of expenses that can be charged to nonmembers. According to 
the Court, objectors must only pay their portion of those ex-
penses that were “necessarily or reasonably incurred for the 
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative 
of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-
management issues.”174  Political spending is the quintessen-
tial type of expenditure than cannot be charged to objectors.175
Although the basic principle of separation has been estab-
lished, there is still controversy over the mechanisms unions 
must follow in implementing this principle.  The NLRB and the 
courts have wrestled with questions such as the notice that un-
ions need to provide about their expenditures,176 the informa-
tion unions must provide to objectors about expenditures,177 
by McCain-Feingold.  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-155, Title II, §§ 203, 204, 214(d), 116 Stat. 91, 92, 95. 
 170. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II 2007). 
 171. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003). 
 172. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of 
Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station, 466 U.S. 
435 (1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
 173. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744–45 (1963) (permitting 
“agency shop” agreements whereby unions charge non-members for the costs of 
collective representation). 
 174. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. 
 175. Machinists, 367 U.S. at 766–69; Beck, 487 U.S. at 740 (finding that objec-
tors need not participate in “the union’s expenditure of their fees on activities 
such as . . . lobbying for labor legislation, and participating in social, charitable, 
and political events”). 
 176. See, e.g., California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995) enforced 
sub nom. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133 
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 177. Id. at 239–41; see also Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
2008] LABOR AND PRIVATE EQUITY 1351 
 
and the process unions must provide for objectors to contest the 
nature of different types of spending.178  Most recently, the Su-
preme Court upheld the right of states to require that public-
sector unions receive affirmative authorization from a non-
member before spending that nonmember’s agency-shop fees 
for election-related purposes.179
This line of jurisprudence requiring a separation between 
collective-bargaining expenses and “unrelated” expenses has 
been oft criticized in the law review literature.180  Much of the 
commentary has focused on statutory interpretation and Con-
gressional intent, arguing that Congress did not mean to cur-
tail the union’s political activity.181  However, the SEIU private 
equity campaign demonstrates the inherent flaw in the founda-
tional premise that political spending is not collective-
bargaining spending. 
Political activity forms an integral part of almost all 
SEIU’s organizing campaigns.  The support of local politicians 
puts additional pressure on employers.182  Good relations with 
these politicians help ensure their presence on the picket lines 
when needed.  Perhaps more importantly than such face time, 
however, is the behind-the-scenes support that politicians can 
provide.  Some support is in the form of governmental spend-
ing; state and local authorities may place certain union-
oriented requirements on employers if they want to do govern-
ment projects.183  However, state and federal regulation also 
Television & Radio Artists (KGW Radio), 327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999). 
 178. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998); California Saw, 320 
N.L.R.B. at 242. 
 179. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007). 
 180. For a sampling of commentary, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Se-
curity Agreements under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Con-
stitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51 (1990); 
George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 
15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 230–41 (1994); Martin H. Malin, The Su-
preme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127 
(1992); Charles R. Virginia, Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: Su-
preme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 665 (1989). 
 181. See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 768 (1988) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding “simply cannot be de-
rived from the plain language of the statute”); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 180. 
 182. See Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 48 (discussing support from Califor-
nia state and local representatives in the 2000 L.A. Justice for Janitors strike); 
Casebeer, supra note 105, at 17 (discussing support of local Miami politicians, as 
well as presidential candidate John Edwards). 
 183. For example, New York and California have enacted legislation prohibit-
ing the use of state funds or property to assist, promote, or deter union organiz-
ing.  N.Y. LABOR LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2003)); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16645 (West 
1352 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
shapes the process of the organizing drive itself.  In 1999 
changes in California state law made it harder to obtain in-
junctions against street demonstrations and other public gath-
erings.  SEIU was thus much freer to conduct these demonstra-
tions in its 2000 Justice for Janitors campaign.184  On the 
federal level, the Employee Free Choice Act would require em-
ployers to accept the card-check certification that SEIU now 
works so hard to implement through employer consent.185
Moreover, SEIU’s political power is often the “added value” 
that the union can bring to the table in negotiations.  As dis-
cussed earlier, SEIU has worked with potential employers to 
develop ways of helping all of the company’s stakeholders.186  
For example, SEIU has pushed for greater state funding and 
reimbursement for health care providers whose employees are 
SEIU members.  In the private equity context, SEIU has 
heightened its leverage with the Carlyle Group by pushing for 
greater oversight of the company’s level of patient care.  On a 
broader level, the union may also be dangling its support (or 
opposition) to private equity tax hikes as part of the overall 
deal.187
None of this makes SEIU different than any other organi-
zation that is seeking to serve its membership.  In particular, 
SEIU is acting like all savvy businesses do by protecting its in-
terests in the political arena.  Such interest-group politics may 
seem crass.  But as one commentator has argued, “corporate 
demand for political activity is a natural response to the effect 
2000)).  However, the Supreme Court recently found the California provision to be 
preempted by the NLRA.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 
(June 19, 2008). 
 184. Erickson et al., supra note 98, at 38–42. 
 185. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
 186. See Part II supra. 
 187. Congress has yet to act on these bills, heightening the possibility that 
they are being used as political capital.  In October 2007, Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid told private equity groups that the proposed tax hikes on private eq-
uity would not be enacted that year.  Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Buyout Firms to Avoid 
Tax Hike; Reid Passes Word Senate Won’t Act, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at A1.  
As Stephen Bainbridge has pointed out, such bills are useful bargaining chips 
only when they have not yet been passed.  Posting of Stephen Bainbridge to Pun-
ditry, On the Democrats Not Taxing Hedge Fund Millionaires, 
http://www.stephenbainbridge.com/index.php/punditry/on_the_democrats_not_tax
ing_hedge_fund_millionaires (Nov. 5, 2007) (“Where the interest group is fixed on 
avoiding a change in the status quo, however, the balance of power shifts to the 
politicos who can use threats to the status quo as a way of extracting funds from 
the threatened group on an ongoing basis.”). 
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of legal rules on business operations.”188  Corporations engage 
in extensive lobbying all the time in order to further their cor-
porate objectives through the political system.189  Given the 
pervasive and fluctuating schemes of government regulation, it 
would be foolhardy for companies not to be engaged in the po-
litical process.190
The notion of businesses seeking to protect and enhance 
their regulatory environment is even more compelling in the 
union context.  The product that unions are “selling”—namely 
collective representation services—is a creature of federal 
law.191  It is law that determines the conditions under which 
union can look for new members and serve their current ones.  
State and local law plays a role by regulating public strikes and 
demonstrations as well as access to the employer’s private 
property.  In these arenas, unions must compete against man-
agement groups to tilt the playing fields in their favor.  How-
ever, unions can also work with companies and management to 
improve the regulatory climate for that industry.  A union’s po-
litical activity is generally not an extracurricular activity unre-
lated to collective bargaining.  As the SEIU experience shows, 
politics is always in the service of the core business.  SEIU has 
amassed significant political power, through its financial re-
sources and the voting power of its members.192  It uses this 
power to secure better terms for its members and offer its ser-
vices to an ever-expanding pool of health and building-
maintenance workers.  In other words, it uses politics to better 
 188. Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2005). 
 189. Id. at 1502; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 147–48 n.46 
(2003) (“Labor and business leaders believe—based on experience and with good 
reason—that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect govern-
mental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they 
have given large sums of money to the parties.” (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (statement of a former air-
line executive))). 
 190. Fisch, supra note 188, at 1570 (“Regulation has become an important fac-
tor for U.S. businesses.  As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated 
within a corporation’s overall business strategy, and corporations need to develop 
and manage their political capital in the same way that they manage other busi-
ness assets.”). 
 191. See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representa-
tion, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 35–45 (2008) (discussing unions as a producers of a service). 
 192. See Steven Greenhouse, A Union with Clout Stakes Its Claim                   
on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/us/politics/30unions.htm. 
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its product and grow its market share—just like any other 
business.193
This recognition is something of a double-edged sword.  On 
the one hand, it exposes the illogic of any attempt to separate 
political funding from the expenses devoted to the “core” busi-
ness.  On the other hand, it shows how SEIU and other unions 
are not altruistic charitable organizations, thinking only of the 
common good.194  Rather, they are businesses that provide ser-
vices.  As such, their lobbying can be lumped in with the lobby-
ing that goes on from every other business in every other in-
dustry.  Perhaps the services provided are more beneficial to 
human progress than, say, cigarettes.195  But it would be a mis-
take to assume that unions lobby solely for the good of workers.  
They are organizations that provide services to workers, and 
there are potential conflicts of interests between the providers 
and customers.196
Political influence is critical to the survival of unions.  Cur-
rently, the procedures and standards surrounding the exclu-
sion of political expenses from objectors’ dues are sufficiently 
muddled that there is only a minor effect on union political 
power or spending.197  However, even small regulatory changes 
 193. Businesses have also recognized the connection between politics and the 
business of unions.  See Ann Zimmerman & Kris Maher, Wal-Mart Warns of De-
mocratic Win, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A1 (“Wal-Mart Stores Inc. is mobiliz-
ing its store managers and department supervisors around the country to warn 
that if Democrats win power in November, they’ll likely change federal law to 
make it easier for workers to unionize companies—including Wal-Mart.”). 
 194. Unions often benefit from the notion that they are non-profit advocacy 
groups who focus only on the public interest.  For example, see this exchange be-
tween a reporter and SEIU president Andy Stern: 
Q: Why does the SEIU criticize private-equity firms for lobbying when the 
SEIU itself spent $1,845,000 in federal lobbying in 2007? 
A: SEIU members’ money -- and we are talking about voluntary contri-
butions of about $3 a paycheck -- goes to lobby Congress to reform our 
health-care system, to fix broken immigration laws, to provide health 
care for children through SCHIP. These issues will improve the lives of 
millions of people in this country. Carlyle lobbies to protect indefensible 
tax loopholes that benefit a handful of billionaires. Big difference. 
Thomas Heath, Taking on the Buyout Industry, WASH. POST, March 10, 2008, at 
D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/ 
09/AR2008030901559.html. 
 195. See, e.g., THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Room 9 Entertainment 2005). 
 196. For more discussion of unions as service providers, see Bodie, supra note 
191; Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 501 (2000); Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Pro-
posal to Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651 (2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Jeff Canfield, Comment, What a Sham(e): The Broken Beck 
Rights System in the Real World Workplace, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1049 (2001) (dis-
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based on these principles could hamper labor’s political effec-
tiveness down the road.  It is time for the NLRB and the courts 
to recognize that unions, like businesses, must operate in the 
political arena in order to cultivate a favorable regulatory envi-
ronment. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent credit shock may put a damper on the growth 
that private equity has experienced over the past few years.198  
Traditionally, that would have been good news for unions and 
their members.  But a new approach to organizing and bargain-
ing, spearheaded by SEIU, may change that equation.  Private 
equity funds are tough negotiating partners, because of their 
economic savvy and their focus on the bottom line.  But fund 
managers may also prove to have more concern about future 
(at least, five to ten years in the future), as well as a greater 
willingness to negotiate and a more sensitive response to politi-
cal and economic pressure.  Creative unions will craft their 
campaigns to address these strengths and weaknesses. 
It would be a shame, however, if the law prevented the 
market from working.  Current regulations create difficulties 
for unions in exercising their political power, and further “pay-
check protection” reforms could make the situation signifi-
cantly worse.  We need to recognize that unions, like their ne-
gotiating counterparts, are in business.  As such, they should 
be free to pursue their political objectives as any other busi-
ness.  In the meantime, labor’s political foes will fight to re-
strict and constrict union political activity.  It would be an 
ironic end to the story if unions no longer participate in politics 
because they lacked the political power to protect their rights 
in the first place. 
 
cussing the difficulty of enforcing Beck rights). 
 198. For a taste of the gloomy rhetoric, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Ranks of 
the Comfortable Are Still Thinning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/business/09deal.html (“[A]ll of Wall Street 
understands that the private-equity gravy train has jumped the tracks.”).  See 
also Michael J. de la Merced, Buyout Industry Staggers under Weight of Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/ 
business/11equity.html (contending that private equity’s fortunes were “plummet-
ing”). 
